描述
开 本: 16开纸 张: 胶版纸包 装: 平装是否套装: 否国际标准书号ISBN: 9780521070232
This volume examines just why and in what sense, Sir Karl
Popper’s view of empirical falsifiability as the distinguishing
characteristic of science has found appeal among economists. The
limitations of this tenet, both for a philosophy of science and as
a guideline to economic inquiry, are examined, as are several of
the proposed alternatives.
Part I. Popper as a philosopher of science: 1. An appraisal of
Popperian methodology Daniel M. Hausman
2. The natural order J. Klant
Part II. Popper among the economists: 3. Ad hocness in economics
and the Popperian tradition D. Wade Hands
4. Popper and the LSE economists Neil de Marchi
Part III. Falsification and trying to do without it: 5. The case
for falsification Terence W. Hutchison
6. John Hicks and the methodology of economics Mark Blaug
Part IV. The missing chapter: empirical work and its appraisal: 7.
Finding a satisfactory empirical model Mary Morgan
8. The neo-Walrasian program is empirically progressive E. Roy
Weintraub
Part V. Non-Popperian perspectives on economics: 9. The case for
pluralism Bruce J. Caldwell
10. Thick and thin methodologies in the history of economic thought
Donald N. McCloskey
11. Economics as discourse Arjo Klamer.
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