中国共产党如何决策（英）

中国共产党一路走来，从小到大、从弱到强，尤其是改革开放以来，带领中国人民奋勇拼搏，取得举世瞩目的辉煌成就。从根上来看，这与党的有效决策密不可分。本书用“一个导向、六根支柱”的框架结构来阐述党是如何进行有效决策的故事，让国际社会真正了解共产党决策是科学、民主的，尤其是有效、合理的。

沈传亮，教授、博士研究生导师，现供职于中共中央党校党史部，主要从事中共党史党建研究，中共决策理论与实践研究，已出版《决策中国：改革开放以来中国共产党决策体制历史演进》等专著8部。主持或参与国家社科基金重点课题、重大课题十多项，发表论文百余篇。

CONTENTSForeword Chapter I People-oriented Approach Chapter II Democratic ConsultationsChapter III Interaction Between Top and BottomChapter IV Step by StepChapter V Respecting ScienceChapter VI Compliance with Laws and RegulationsChapter VII Achieving Better ImplementationPostscript

ForewordThe Communist Party of China (CPC), founded in 1921, has been governing the People’s Republic of China (PRC) for 70. In late 1978, the CPC intiated the reform and opening-up program and has since led the Chinese people to work diligently with a pioneering spirit to create miracles over which the world has marveled. To understand the rise of China that is rooted in a rich cultural legacy, it is essential to understand the CPC, which has more than 89 million members and over 4.5 million Party organizations at different levels. When you talk with people from different countries, they may have different opinions about the Party, yet all of them may show their approval of China’s earthshaking economic and social development. What may be lacking is a clear understanding that China’s success hinges on the progress made by the CPC.Today, foreign readers may find that there are still many mysteries about the CPC, especially in regard to the following:First, amid hundreds of political parties in China existing in the early decades of the 20th Century, how was it possible for the CPC to defeat the powerful Kuomintang and become the sole ruling Party of China?Second, the CPC once made some unfortunate detours, but why can it still gain support from the Chinese people, and lead them to create outstanding achievements in economic and social development that, since 2010, has made the country the world’s second largest economy?Some scholars think the answers lie in the CPC’s focused pursuit, strict discipline, well-developed organizations, and emphasis on economic development and the effort to improve living standards of the Chinese people. Some identify the CPC’s adaptability to withstand external pressures; there are also scholars holding negative views on the CPC who began to use the word “flexibility” to describe its efforts to address challenges. David Shambaugh, an American authority on China, for example, says the CPC is good at responding to changing situations.The statements above are all correct to some extent, but they are far from reaching the core of the situation. This author believes the key to its success is that the CPC, during its governance of the country, has formed a set of structures, systems and mechanisms for decision-making within the context of the development of the Party, the nation and the people.To look back is to better understand where we are and how to move toward. By reviewing the evolution of the CPC’s decision-making processes during the past 100 years, especially in the past 40 years of reform and opening up, this book seeks to present a “mental map” of the CPC’s effective decision-making and help readers to understand the distinctive features and main ideas of the same.First, the CPC is committed to a people-centered approach and to the best interests of the Chinese people when making decisions. Its success is related to its high regard and active response to issues most affecting and worrying the people. As CPC General Secretary Xi Jinping has said, the aspirations of the people to live a better life must always be the focus of the efforts of all Party members, requiring them to put the people first.Second, the CPC emphasizes consultation, and seeks opinions for major decisions from all sides, especially through the people’s congress system at various levels, the political consultative conference and CPC congress, enhancing democratic decision-making. The CPC encourages consultation for the people and with the people, before proceeding to make and implement major decisions. It is necessary for someone to take lead in a consultation, and in this case, it is the CPC.
Third, the CPC’s decision-making is a process of interaction, involving both vigorous top-down promotion and active bottom-up appeals. Since the reform and opening up began, the CPC has been gathering wisdom from the masses and inserting them into national policies. Meanwhile, it also carries out top-level design in due course to promote the reform comprehensively.Fourth, the CPC never rushes in making any decision, but first establishes pilot programs that can be expanded after gaining more experience, this ensuring a gradual progress. Decision-making for a major country can never be too quick, too slow, too far left or too far right; otherwise, problems will arise. Taking the development of pilot free trade zones as an example, a trial was first made in Shanghai, and then replicated in Guangzhou and other cities after gaining valuable experience.Fifth, the CPC undertakes to make decisions, especially those of high-level, that are technically correct. Before making a decision, it solicits opinions extensively, allowing experts to participate in screening and argumentation to avoid subjective judgment. Before making major decisions, the Party always conducts investigations and studies in all aspects to understand the real situation, embodying the spirit of scientific decision-making.Sixth, the CPC adheres to law-based decision-making, developing regulations for decision-making, upholding democratic centralism, and establishing the principle of accountability and a corrective mechanism. CPC General Secretary Xi Jinping has always emphasized lifelong accountability for decision-making, like a sword of Damocles hanging over the head of the related official.Seventh, the CPC requires concrete actions for each and every decision. No matter how good the decision is, nothing will happen without proper execution. It attaches great importance to implementation. CPC cadres at all levels are well aware of the importance of implementing the decisions of the CPC Central Committee. Under such pressure, to correctly put decisions into action has become the top priority for Party members at the primary level.A political party’s capability and the effectiveness of decision-making is critical to not only the life of that party, but also the future of its country. The rise and fall of any party is attributed to not only the institutional mechanisms of a particular country, but also decision-making ability. In some countries, the ruling party lacks foresight and visionary leaders, and often makes wrong decisions, causing national decline. Mao Zedong, Party founder, regarded policies and strategies as the lifeblood of the CPC. As the ruling party of China, the CPC is good at drawing on past experiences, follows rules adapting to different situations, so as to develop a great decision-making capability. The CPC broke the so-called “law of politics” many times when no one believed it could succeed. Led by the CPC, China has created unprecedented miracles and is shifting from a large country to a strong country.The CPC has had a stable leadership core for most of the time, able to make decisions efficiently. This is one of the major advantages of its decision-making system. According to Professor Wang Shaoguang, “this is very important against the backdrop that many countries are inevitably trapped in a situation where no decision can be made”, because “there are too many players with veto rights”. In October 2016, the 6th Plenary Session of the 18th CPC Central Committee defined the core position of General Secretary Xi Jinping in the CPC Central Committee and the Party. In October 2017, the 19th CPC National Congress declared that socialism with Chinese characteristics had entered a new era, and included Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era as the Party’s guiding ideology. These major moves further facilitate the decision-making of the CPC.China has a fine traditional culture nurtured over more than 5,000 years. To understand China, you must understand its ruling party, the CPC. If you don’t understand the CPC, you can’t understand China. And to understand the CPC, you must understand how it makes decisions. It should be pointed out that the CPC’s decision-making mentioned in this book mainly refers to the high-level decision-making or that of the CPC Central Committee, and does not involve that existing at the primary-level. Because the approaches of the two are quite different: the latter is often influenced by the former, and may encounter uncertainties.It is necessary to point out that the CPC’s decision-making is not perfect. There are mistakes, and the decision-making system needs to be improved with the passage of time. Overall, however, the CPC’s efficient and centralized decision-making is no doubt a key to Chinese miracles, Chinese achievements and Chinese wisdom attracting the attention of the entire world. 

t is a prominent feature that the Chinese Communist Party adheres to follow the “mass line” in decision-making. In 1978, Anhui Province was stricken by a severe drought that caused serious hardship at the time of the autumn planting. To tide over the famine, the provincial Party committee decided to make provision for recovery. Part of farmland were lent to peasants to grow wheat and vegetables. The resulting output was kept from the usual State procurement and made available exclusively for the local grain ration. Such an initiative reminded the masses of the policy fix farmland quotas on a household basis once adopted in the 1950s to communities pull through severe famine. Fengyang County of Anhui, long renowned for its flower-drum opera, was the original point of fixing farm output quotas for each household in certain stricken villages. Among them, Xiaogang Village of Liyuan Commune was the most notable. Eighteen households secretly signed a contract in a winter night of 1978. This was the beginning of the household-based contract system. Due to many uncertainties about this pioneering attempt, they signed the agreement in secret for fear their action would affect their families. When the land was distributed to each household, the farmers were fully motivated. Despite the drought, everybody exerted themselves to farm to the utmost extent. Output doubled in 1979. A couple of years later, the village produced a greater amount of grain than ever before. The community was transformed into a notable wealthy village, shedding its past infamous reputation as a “beggar village”.Actually, there were many villages undertaking making their own experiments. In early October 1978, the Laozhuang production team of the Guanting Commune Farm Brigade in Feixi County of Anhui followed their team leader to distribute land to each household. Attach to the land handout was a provision that work points would be calculated based on outputs and a fixed quota was set as 100 kg of grain produced per mu (0.067 hectares)；by the following year’s harvest, every additional 0.5 kg of grain gained a household a reward of three work points; each family might keep any surplus, but receive no supplementary award. In addition, they needed to be self-financing in regard to the purchase of seeds and fertilizers. It was the first production team adopting the system in Anhui province, and, indeed, even in the whole country. The Sichuan provincial Party committee also supported peasants to fix output quotas for each group. And, it allowed and even encouraged commune members to establish appropriate family sideline production operations. Similar practices were later in a number of other provinces.Opinions on this development were mixed. Some people objected to such bold attempts by the peasants independently, some were silent, but others expressed their support. Deng Xiaoping stood with the latter group. As a matter of fact, he pledged to introduce more flexible policies in rural areas when he resumed high political office for the third time in his long career. During a debriefing session with Guangdong provincial Party committee leaders in November 1977, Deng specially mentioned the rural policies: “It seems that the policy issue is the most prominent. It is the key question as to whether the policies are proper. This is also a national issue. It needs to be set right. Purportedly, raising several ducks is deemed to be good socialist practice; yet, with a few more, it becomes capitalism. Such a provision should be criticized. It is wrong.” In February 1978, he told Sichuan provincial Party committee leaders: “Both rural and urban areas face policy issues. Leaving peasants no room for maneuver, how can that work? Rural and urban policies need to be checked by the central and local governments, not sporadically but under consideration as a whole. Do what you can do within your power to settle some questions; make some room for local input at least.” During his investigation in the Northeast region in the following September, Deng also stressed that the much-extolled pioneering practices in Dazhai [the village in Shanxi Province] should not be copied blindly. As for rural reform, Deng Xiaoping suggested to “wait and see” rather to jump to any hasty conclusion. His attitude gave backing to the attempts by peasants to build up family fortunes.However, the CPC Central Committee didn’t show clear attitude towards the spontaneous rural reform attempt to change the existing poverty-stricken life. Under the complicated situation of the times, even the communiqué issued after the Third Plenary of the 11th CPC Central Committee in December 1978, which marked the historical turning point, had to explicitly forbid practices including fixing output quotas to each household and distributing land for individual farming families. Consequently, peasant initiatives of this sort aroused disputes within the Party. At the symposium on rural work of seven provinces and three counties held by the national agriculture committee in March 1979, Deng Xiaoping said that rural problems were great in number, that efforts should focus first on the major ones, and poverty-stricken areas needed to adopt more liberal policies. Wan Li, the chief backer of the Anhui rural reforms, went to meet Deng during the meeting. The latter encouraged him to keep to the chosen course. When the dispute over rural reform rose around his head like a swarm of bees in April 1980, Deng encouraged Wan Li, saying: “No need to argue. You just do what you’ve been doing, just seek truth from facts.” Deng also remarked: “With regard to scarcely populated and backward areas with poor living conditions, such as Guizhou, Yunnan, and Gansu and other provinces in the northwest, I approve of relaxing restrictions and enabling each household to find their own way to increase output and income. Some may contract to groups, and others follow an individual way. There is no need to fear this will affect the socialist nature of our system.”On many occasions later, Deng Xiaoping gave credit for the practice of fixing output quotas for each household. He described it as a responsibility system under socialism, neither exploiting others nor violating the principle of collective ownership. It could arouse people’s enthusiasm while embodying the socialist principle of distribution according to work. This was conducive to a socialist economy rather than a move towards capitalism. Afterwards, the CPC Central Committee further confirmed the socialist nature of fixing output quotas for each household, although there were undoubtedly some unwilling to accept the idea. Deng stated later (in 1992): “In the beginning, not all of us agreed to reform. Some provinces wavered. Parts of them waited for a year before catching up, others spent two years. The Central Committee was waiting them, let the facts teach them a lesson.” With his strong support, the CPC Central Committee issued five No.1 documents in succession in the 1980s to make definite the socialist nature of the system. This set the peasants’ minds at rest.As for the people’s commune system that had a history of over 20 years, Deng believed: “It doesn’t fit in the present low productivity in rural China” and “through experiment, it didn’t work as well as it was designed”. So, he proposed: “Government administration and commune management should be separated. This is what we need to do now before it’s late.” The Fifth Session of the Fifth National People’s Congress in December 1982 amended the Constitution, and resolved to break up the rural government system and the people’s commune and rebuild county administration. With three years of efforts, more than 90,000 county and township level governments were established, marking completion of basic-level rural reform.China’s reform over the last 40 years drew inspiration from peasant creative involvement in many major decisions. The rural responsibility system stimulated the enthusiasm of the masses and generated increased grain output. The grain yield was close to 400 billion kg in 1984, settling the food shortage problem that had lingered in China for decades. Entering 1985, Henan, as one of the major grain-producing provinces, even found it was hard to sell its output. From shortage to surplus, it proved the household contract responsibility system had brought a positive change to rural areas. Therefore, in the early period of SOE reform that started in 1980s, the contract system was all the rage, becoming a magic weapon that stood numerous tests.