中国在人类命运共同体中的角色（英文版）

《中国在人类命运共同体中的角色》是全球中国出版社与新世界出版社合作出版的又一次尝试。本书是著名社会学家、全球化理论先驱马丁·阿尔布劳教授对未来世界中中国所扮演的大国角色和承担的大国使命的探讨。本书具有开拓性的新的理论贡献，具有重大的学术意义和社会意义。

Contents

Foreword by Anthony Giddens 3

Author’s preface 5

Acknowledgments 8

Part One: China’s role in the globalizing world 11

Chapter One. The architectonic of ideas – Xi Jinping: The Governance of
China 13

Chapter Two. Philosophical social science as a bridge from ‘Belt and Road’
to global governance 16

Chapter Three. Harmonizing goals and values: the challenge for Belt and
Road 32

Chapter Four. Bridging the divides: China’s role in a fragmenting world 37

Chapter Five. Leadership for a people’s democracy 50

Part Two: Theory for the global social order 53

Chapter Six. Chinese social theory in global social science 54

Chapter Seven. The challenge of transculturality for the USA and China 58

Chapter Eight. Pragmatic universalism and the quest for global governance
67

Chapter Nine. Can there be a public philosophy for global governance? 77

Chapter Ten. How do we discover common values? 81

Chapter Eleven. The “community of shared destiny” under conditions of
imperfect understanding 86

Part Three: From Max Weber to global society 99

Chapter Twelve. Max Weber, China and the World: in search of transcultural
communication – co-author Zhang Xiaoying 100

Chapter Thirteen. Weber and the concept of adaptation: the case of
Confucian ethics – co-author Zhang Xiaoying 124

Chapter Fourteen. Max Weber, China and the future of global society 149

Postscript: A Chinese episode in the globalization of sociology 166

References 176

Publication History with Abstracts 185

Appendix: The Globalization of Chinese Social Sciences Book Series by
Xiangqun Chang 193

Index 200

Foreword

Anthony Giddens

Professor Martin Albrow is
one of the foremost sociologists in the English-speaking

world and one of the
greatest experts on globalization, perhaps the most significant

driving force of our times.
In his pioneering work The Global Age (1996), written when the term
‘globalization’ itself was quite new, he set out the main dimensions of the
profound changes that had begun to transform world society. In its most
fundamental meaning, ‘globalization’ refers to the intensifying interdependence
of individuals, institutions and states across the globe.

One dimension is economic – the spread of a world marketplace,
a massively complex division of labour between and within companies and their
workforces, coupled with financial institutions of global scope. However,
globalization is also political and cultural. Increasing globalization confers
many benefits, at the same time as it opens up new stresses and strains. Think,
for example, of the case of China itself which, when the country opened itself
out to the wider world some three decades ago, travelled all the way from mass
starvation to a level of prosperity that once would have seemed inconceivable.
There are still many who live close to the breadline. Yet in China’s prospering
cities today one of the main health issues is the very opposite: rising levels
of obesity, a condition not of scarcity but of abundance.

Many in current times speak of globalization going into
reverse. The reverberations

of the global economic crisis
are still being felt, especially in Western countries. Whole segments of those
countries have not shared in the rising levels of abundance experienced by the
majority. There are significant cultural divisions too. Cosmopolitan values – a
welcoming of cultural diversity, equality between the sexes and a comfort with
geographical mobility – have flowered in many larger cities. In other regions,
especially those that have not shared in rising prosperity, there has been a
marked reaction against these values. Resentment against immigration, hostile
or racist attitudes towards ‘foreigners’, and towards ethnic or cultural
minorities, has again become commonplace. These are the attitudes that have
helped fuel the rise of populist parties in the West, parties which explicitly

set themselves against
globalization and wish to return to the more traditional nation-state. The most
significant consequence in global terms is the ascent of Donald Trump to power
in the United States, a leader who wants to reverse what he sees as America’s
declining power and who blames globalization for the US’s problems rather than
seeing it as the source of its relative prosperity.

Make no mistake, however: globalization has not gone into
reverse and short of calamity there is no chance of its doing so. Whatever its
stresses and strains, the world is more and more interdependent every day. One
of the prime reasons is the rise of the digital revolution, which has moved
globalization – i.e. interdependence – to a wholly different level. The
celebrated Canadian thinker Marshall McLuhan, writing many years ago at the
outset of the digital revolution, coined the term ‘global village’ to describe
the trajectory of world society. How right he was, but even he could never have
guessed how far that process would develop. Consider on the level of everyday
life. Someone takes a plane to London. That trip takes only some ten hours or
so, an everyday miracle which depends upon global

satellite systems circling
high above the earth. On arrival she calls her parents on her smartphone. It is
another everyday miracle. She can see them and vice versa; and they can talk
almost as if they were in the same room. Moreover, they can do so almost for
nothing. And of course political leaders and billions of other ordinary people
can do the same thing.

The global village is what I call a ‘high opportunity, high
risk’ world, where we do not know in advance how that balance of opportunity
and risk will play out. The opportunities are everywhere, China’s rise to world
influence, and probably world leadership, being among them. They are of a scale
that human beings have not experienced before, as witnessed in myriad
scientific and technological advances, moving faster than ever before precisely
because of globalization. To take just one example, this could be an era of
massive innovation in medicine, because of the capacity of scientists to
collaborate across the world and be in instantaneous communication with one
another. Yet the risks are also without precedent in previous periods of
history, in some large part because they too are globalized – we

just do not know at this
point whether as a species we can deal with the combined

threats of climate change,
a world population approaching ten billion, the proliferation

of nuclear weapons, mass
migration and the potential for global pandemics.

In this book Albrow does a remarkable job of shedding light on
these extraordinary

changes and on the pivotal
role that China is likely to have in shaping their further evolution. As the
United States pulls back from its former global role, China not only can, but
must, assume a pivotal position in shaping world society for the better. The
progress of the ‘Belt and Road’ initiative will be only one element in
determining whether China’s new world role will help heal divisions and promote
peaceful global cooperation. That initiative has to demonstrate that it is a vehicle
for free cooperation, not an imposition of sectional power.

Albrow fruitfully deploys the thinking of Xi Jinping in showing
how all this might be achieved, but links that thinking in an impressive way
with Western traditions, old and new. Max Weber, who a century ago sought to
pinpoint the cultural origins of Western capitalism, at the same time was
fascinated with Eastern religion and culture. His writings, the author shows,
still provide core ideas for a rethinking of global cooperation today. We
should reject the idea that our hypermodern world can be stabilized and
pacified only by hypermodern concepts and technologies. Almost the contrary is
the case. In rediscovering the deep roots of shared civilizational values, we
can shape a global ethics that can be the foundation

of a resurgence of global cooperation.