描述
开 本: 16开纸 张: 胶版纸包 装: 平装-胶订是否套装: 否国际标准书号ISBN: 9787513063449
Contents
Ⅰ.
Introduction……………………………………………………………………………………………
1
1.1
Purpose……………………………………………………………………………………….
1
1.2 Object and
Scope………………………………………………………………………..
5
1.3 Methodology……………………………………………………………………………..
10
Ⅱ. Theoretical Background and Analytical
Framework…………………………. 12
2.1 Rent-seeking
Theory…………………………………………………………………
12
2.1.1 Conventional Theory of
Rent-seeking…………………………. 12
2.1.2 Rent-seeking in the Developing
Countries…………………… 18
2.2 Rent-seeking in China’s Plan-based
Economy………………………… 24
2.2.1 Rent-seeking in the Transitional
Economy after Reform 25
2.2.2 Rent-seeking in the Centrally Planned
Economy
before
Reform………………………………………………………………
29
2.3 Analytical Model of Rent Utilization
for the
Plan-based Economy…………………………………………………………………
33
2.3.1 Institutional Context for the
Analytical Model…………….. 33
2.3.2 Analytical Model of Rent
Utilization……………………………. 34
Ⅲ. Rent Utilization in China’s Auto Industry:
Before Reform………………. 38
3.1 The Development of Auto Industry in the
Centrally
Planned Economy before
Reform…………………………………………… 38
3.2 Rents and Rent Creation
……………………………………………………….. 42
3.3 Rent
Allocation…………………………………………………………………………
48
3.3.1 Fragmented Structure of Rent
Allocation in the
Central
Level…………………………………………………………………
50
3.3.2 Multilayered Structure of Rent
Allocation between
Central Level and Local
Level…………………………………… 56
3.3.3 Institutional Arrangements of Local
Governments Being Rent-seekers
……………………………. 58
3.4 Rent-seeking
……………………………………………………………………………
62
3.4.1 Local Governments as the Principal
Rent-seekers 62
3.4.2 State-owned Enterprises Became
Rent-seekers
with the Help of Local
Governments…………………. 67
Ⅳ. Rent Utilization in China’s Auto Industry:
After Reform ………………. 70
4.1 The Development of Auto Industry in the
Transitional
Economy of After Reform
Stage…………………………………………….. 70
4.2 Rents and Rent
Creation………………………………………………………….. 77
4.3 Rent
Allocation…………………………………………………………………………
89
4.3.1 The Disappearance of Traditional
Rent-allocators ……. 90
4.3.2 The Fragmented Authority of Project
Approval ………. 95
4.4 Rent-seeking
……………………………………………………………………………
99
4.4.1 Rent-seeking by Local Governments
…………………………. 99
4.4.2 Rent-seeking by Enterprises
……………………………………… 105
Ⅴ. Comprehensive
Analysis……………………………………………………………………
116
5.1 Rent Utilization in the Auto
Industry……………………………………. 116
5.1.1 Rents and Rent
Creation…………………………………………….. 116
5.1.2 Rent
Allocation……………………………………………………………
118
5.1.3
Rent-seeking…………………………………………………………………
120
5.2 Diachronic
Comparison………………………………………………………….
124
Ⅵ. Conclusions………………………………………………………………………………………..
130
References………………………………………………………………………………………………..
137
List of Tables
Table 1 Estimates of the Welfare Losses
from Rent-seeking……………….. 16
Table 2 Relevant Growth and Efficiency
Implications of
Different
Rents………………………………………………………………………….
19
Table 3 Interest Rate of Industrial Credit
Adjustments(Monthly rate)… 45
Table 4 Exchange Rate Adjustments
(US$100 and Sterling ￡100=RMB
¥)……………………………………. 46
Table 5 Central and Local Investment in the
Auto Industry,
1949~1978 (RMB Billion)………………………………………………………..
65
Table 6 Total Automobile Output and Sedan
Output, 2002~2015…….. 76
Table 7 Tariffs for Imported Automobiles,
1986~2006……………………… 82
Table 8 Joint ventures Built in China from
1984 to 2010…………………. 111
Table 9 Major Actors of Rent Utilization
and Their Functions and
Strategies in China’s Auto Industry before
and after Reform 124
List of Figures
Figure 1 Institutional Rent under a
Low-Price Control………………………… 31
Figure 2 Analytical Model of Rent
Utilization………………………………………. 35
Figure 3 Number of Auto Plant and Special
Vehicle
Factories,
1956~1978……………………………………………………………….
40
Figure 4 Output of Automobiles,
1956~1978……………………………………… 41
Figure 5 Governing Structure of Soviet
Union’s Auto Industry…………. 50
Figure 6 Fragmented Structure of Rent
Allocation in the Central Level 55
Figure 7 Multilayered Structure of Rent
Allocation between
Central and Local
Level……………………………………………………………. 57
Figure 8 Imports of sedans,
1979~2001………………………………………………. 71
Figure 9 Output of Total Automobiles and
Sedans, 1979~2001………… 72
Figure 10 Number of Auto Plants,
1979~2001…………………………………… 74
Figure 11 The Fragmented Structure and Rent
Allocation Mechanism. 97
Figure 12 Rent Utilization Before
Reform………………………………………….. 126
Figure 13 Rent Utilization After
Reform……………………………………………. 126
Preface
When mentioning rent seeking, conventional
wisdom believes that rent seeking is nothing but a pathological phenomenon
because rent seeking constitutes a type of unproductive activity which results
in social loss and is thus growth-retarding. Recent study, however, shows a
different story. It is said that rents are ubiquitous and of different types;
rents are able to be created and allocated in many ways; rent seeking has
complicated and profound implications to economic growth.
Rather than conventional rent-seeking
approach from methodological individualism, this book applies a much more
far-reaching approach from an institutional perspective. Following the approach
advanced by Boyd and Ngo among many others, this book puts forward an
analytical model of “rent-utilization” and identifies it into three phases, i.e.
rent creation, rent allocation and rent-seeking, extending the application of
classical rent-seeking approach towards China’s auto industry in a plan-based
economic system.
The central purpose of this book is to
discuss the rent utilization in China’s auto industry, to explain how it
shapes, if not totally, at least partly, the development of the auto industry,
focusing on the types of rents, and on the actors, both individual and
institutional, and on the related outcomes, both the economic and political,
and on the influential factors, both formally and informally institutional, in
the different development stages.
China’s auto industry has experienced over
60-year development since the early 1950s, which is roughly divided into two
halves in this book. The first half (the mid-1950s through 1978) in the
centrally planned economy is termed as “Before Reform”stage, and the second
half (1979 through the mid-2000s) in the transitional economy as“After
Reform”stage.
The study in this book showed some findings
conflicting with existing conclusions. The mainstream literature denies that
the existence of rent-seeking activities, even the existence of rents, in the
centrally planned economy, but this study found that institutional rent created
by central government through price control was the main sources of rent before
Reform, and this type of rent endogenously originated from the planned economic
system per se and lasted for a long time.
Rent-seeking activities appeared along the
whole development process of China’s auto industry, whether before or after the
Reform. Rent-seeking by local governments was a common phenomenon in both
stages. The sharp difference between before Reform and after Reform was that
the enterprises, especially the State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) that gained some
autonomy from the governments became another main actor of rent-seeking with
many means. Besides, non-state owned enterprises, such as foreign enterprises
and private enterprises also began to enter the rent-seeking game after Reform.
Rent-seeking per se in China’s auto
industry could be identified as a means of destroying the monopoly of the
state. In the plan-based economy, the state taking the central government as
its first-level agent was the unique legitimate owner of all the rents. The
central government attempted to strengthen its authority by re-centralization
but failed every time. Although the ostensible target of rent-seeking by local
governments and enterprises was the rents of all types created by the state,
what they really attempted to change was the institutional arrangements inside
the multilayered and fragmented structure of rent allocation. In other words,
centrally tight control was impossible without the change of that existed
multilayered and fragmented structure. Therefore, the widespread rent-seeking
activities by local governments conspired with enterprises could be considered
as one of the critical factors that push the market-oriented reform to come
true.
In the plan-based economy, the state was an
elaborate but imperfect device of rent utilization. The central government
created substantial rents to develop the auto industry as one of pillar
industries. It established corresponding institutional arrangements in order to
attain the goal of this industrial policy. As the monopolistic owner of these
rents, it allocated them to local governments with multi-levels of hierarchies
and to some SOEs. In the process, substantial autonomy with oversight authority
was transferred to local governments.The M-form hierarchical structure, formal
decentralizations, information asymmetry and geographical remoteness caused the
relationship between central and local governments to form multiple
principal-agent situations. Thus, a structure of rent utilization for the auto
industry was fragmented in the central government agencies and multi-layered
among the central-local governments from the day of its birth. The
administrative decentralization that transferred authority from the central to
local governments before and after Reform strengthened this multi-layered
nature while the economic decentralization that transferred authority from
governments to enterprises and families made the whole structure more
fragmented and divided, and finally the resultant force of them ended it in the
early 2000s.
In other words, the rent utilization was
embedded in the regulatory framework which governs industrial and economic
developments at the national level as well as the local level. To a great
extent, rent utilization in China was institutionalized as the constitutive
part of economic governance through intimately connecting to the political
system.
Rent-seeking in plan-based economies has
been out of research focus area for a long time. The model of rent-utilization
in this book does not reject or deny the wisdom of classical rent-seeking
theory. Rather, this model complements and supports it.
This book is a revised and updated version
of my doctoral dissertation Rent Utilization in a Plan-based Economy: Extension
of Rent-seeking Theory towards China’s Auto Industry. I would like to express
my sincere gratitude to the following people among many others who supported me
during the writing of my doctoral dissertation and the publication of this
book.
To my supervisor, Professor Kim Haengbum,
for his friendly encouragement, his academic rigor and his patient guidance in
supervisions, for his tolerance in personality, and his fatherly selfless help
in my everyday life. Honestly, my doctoral dissertation could not have been
completed and this book could not have been published without Professor Kim’s
assistance and guidance.
To the Committee Members for my doctoral
dissertation, Professor Kang Yunho, Professor Park Minjeong, Profesor Kim
Insin, especially the Chair, Professor Hahn Inkeun, who read the text for
several times and gave me specific advice, for their constructive suggestions.
To the two anonymous referees and Professor
Lee Seong-gyu for their professional suggestions on the early version of my
doctoral dissertation.
To Professor Kang, Professor Park, and
Assistant Lee, and all the other professors in Public Administration Department
of Pusan National University, for their sincerely help.
To my colleagues both at International
College of University of Suwon and School of Political Science and Law College
of Pingdingshan University for their friendly help.
To Ms. Yang Xiaohong, the Deputy Director,
and Ms. Lantao, the Copyeditor both from Intellectual Property Publishing House
Co., Ltd. for their patient help and professional service. If there are any
errors, they are not theirs, but all mine.
Finally I would like to thank all my family
for their love and support. Thank my dear wife, Zhang Shu, who has been and
will always go to the end of the world together with me, for her sincere trust,
her affectionate companionship, her pure love and her sacrifice for our family.
Thank my lovely daughter, Gao Shalang(Sharon), for the supreme surprise and joy
she has brought to me. Sharon is an angel and a mascot, whom God sent to me in
the middle of my second and third round dissertation defense to let me
accomplish my“mission” — A doctoral candidate has to pass at least three round
dissertation defenses before earning a Ph.D. in Pusan National University. Her
lovely face, and even her occasional cry brought me great pleasure to my
nervons writing life.
I would like to express my heartfelt thanks
to my Parents-in-law, Zhang Fang and Shu Yulan, for their tolerance and
confidence in me, for their painstaking care for all of us.
I owe a real debt to my parents, Gao
Zhenyun and Zhang Guifang, who now live in the heaven without pain and worry,
for their endless love and selfless support. Without them, I could not have
come so far in my life. I owed them so much that I could not pay them back
forever. I hope that I could meet them again and be reborn as their son in the
heaven. I dedicate this book to my parents.
Gao Jianyi
March 4th, 2019
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