牛津英文经典：常识

本书收录了托马斯·潘恩的《常识》《美国危机》《致杰斐逊的一封信》《人的权利》等论政治的精彩篇章，是政治思想史经典著作。由牛津大学奥里尔学院政治学研究员、导师Mark Philp导读并撰写注释。

1，版本

该系列丛书是从牛津大学出版社引进的精校版本，是牛津大学出版社延续百年的版本

2，高水准的名家导读

由牛津、剑桥等名校教授撰写导读文章，对提升读者的阅读鉴赏能力大有裨益

3，便利的阅读体验

全书有丰富的注释、词汇解析和完备的背景知识介绍，非常适合自主阅读，提升阅读能力

4，合理的品种组合

在浩如烟海的典籍中，牛津大学出版社根据多年数据积累，优选了有阅读价值的文学、社科等品种

Oxford World’s Classics系牛津大学出版社百年积淀的精品书系。此番由译林出版社原版引进。除牛津品牌保证的权威原著版本之外，每册书附含名家导读、作家简介及年表、词汇解析、文本注释、背景知识拓展、同步阅读导引、版本信息等，特别适合作为大学生和学有余力的中学生英语学习的材料。导读者包括牛津和剑桥大学的资深教授和知名学者。整套书选目精良，便携易读，实为亲近*名著的经典读本。

本书收录了潘恩的《常识》和《人的权利》等论政治的精彩篇章，是政治思想史经典著作。《常识》以先知般的洞察力和政治远见，为北美人民分析了争取独立，在新的原则基础上构建政府的必要性和可行性。潘恩高扬共和与民主的旗帜，批判封建等级制和君主政体，以无私热情和务实思想为民众提出了革命纲领，其影响经久不衰，有很强的可读性。

托马斯·潘恩（Thomas
Paine，1737—1809）

英裔美国思想家、作家、政治活动家、激进民主主义者。美国独立战争期间，他撰写了铿锵有力并广为流传的小册子《常识》，极大地鼓舞了北美民众的独立情绪。他也被视为美国开国元勋之一。

CONTENTS

Acknowledgements

Introduction

Note
on the Texts

Select
Bibliography

A
Chronology of Thomas Paine

COMMON
SENSE

AMERICAN
CRISIS I

AMERICAN
CRISIS XIII

LETTER
TO JEFFERSON

RIGHTS
OF MAN

RIGHTS
OF MAN Part the Second

LETTER
ADDRESSED TO THE ADDRESSERS ON THE LATE PROCLAMATION

DISSERTATION
ON THE FIRST PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNMENT

AGRARIAN
JUSTICE

Explanatory
Notes

Index

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——牛津大学出版社

COMMON SENSE

Of
the Origin and Design of Government in General, with concise Remarks on the
English Constitution.

SOME
writers have so confounded society with government, as to leave little or no
distinction between them; whereas they are not only different, but have
different origins. Society is produced by our wants, and government by our
wickedness; the former promotes our happiness positively by uniting our
affections, the latter negatively by restraining our vices. The one encourages
intercourse, the other creates distinctions. The first is a patron, the last a
punisher.

   Society in every state is a blessing, but
government even in its best state is but a necessary evil; in its worst state
an intolerable one; for when we suffer, or are exposed to the same miseries by
a government, which we might expect in a country without government, our calamities
is heightened by reflecting that we furnish the means by which we suffer.
Government, like dress, is the badge of lost innocence; the palaces of kings
are built on the ruins of the bowers of paradise. For were the impulses of
conscience clear, uniform, and irresistibly obeyed, man would need no other
lawgiver; but that not being the case, he finds it necessary to surrender up a
part of his property to furnish means for the protection of the rest; and this
he is induced to do by the same prudence which in every other case advises him
out of two evils to choose the least. Wherefore, security being the true design
and end of government, it unanswerably follows that whatever form thereof
appears most likely to ensure it to us, with the least expence and greatest
benefit, is preferable to all others.

   In order to gain a clear and just idea of
the design and end of government, let us suppose a small number of persons
settled in some sequestered part of the earth, unconnected with the rest, they
will then represent the first peopling of any country, or of the world. In this
state of natural liberty, society will be their first thought. A thousand
motives will excite them thereto, the strength of one man is so unequal to his
wants, and his mind so unfitted for perpetual solitude, that he is soon obliged
to seek assistance and relief of another, who in his turn requires the same.
Four or five united would be able to raise a tolerable dwelling in the midst of
a wilderness, but one man might labour out the common period of life without
accomplishing any thing; when he had felled his timber he could not remove it,
nor erect it after it was removed; hunger in the mean time would urge him from
his work, and every different want call him a different way. Disease, nay even
misfortune would be death, for though neither might be mortal, yet either would
disable him from living, and reduce him to a state in which he might rather be
said to perish than to die.

   Thus
necessity, like a gravitating power, would soon form our newly arrived
emigrants into society, the reciprocal blessings of which, would supercede, and
render the obligations of law and government unnecessary while they remained
perfectly just to each other; but as nothing but heaven is impregnable to vice,
it will unavoidably happen, that in proportion as they surmount the first
difficulties of emigration, which bound them together in a common cause, they
will begin to relax in their duty and attachment to each other; and this
remissness, will point out the necessity, of establishing some form of
government to supply the defect of moral virtue.

   Some convenient tree will afford them a
State~House, under the branches of which, the whole colony may assemble to
deliberate on public matters. It is more than probable that their first laws
will have the title only of REGULATIONS, and be enforced by no other penalty
than public disesteem. In this first parliament every man, by natural right
will have a feat.

 But as the colony increases, the public
concerns will increase likewise, and the distance at which the members may be
separated, will render it too inconvenient for all of them to meet on every
occasion as a first, when their number was small, their habitations near, and
the public concerns few and trifling. This will point out the convenience of
their consenting to leave the legislative part to be managed by a select number
chosen from the whole body, who are supposed to have the same concerns at stake
which those have who appointed them, and who will act in the same manner as the
whole body would act were they present. If the colony continue increasing, it
will become necessary to augment the number of the representatives, and that
the interest of every part of the colony may be attended to, it will be found
best to divide the whole into convenient parts, each part sending its proper
number, and that the elected might never form to themselves an interest
separate from the electors, prudence will point out the propriety of having
elections often; because as the elected might by that means return and mix
again with the general body of the electors in a few months, their fidelity to
the public will be secured by the prudent reflexion of not making a rod for
themselves. And as this frequent interchange will establish a common interest
with every part of the community, they will mutually and naturally support each
other, and on this (not on the unmeaning name of king) depends the strength of
government, and the happiness of the governed.

Here then
is the origin and rise of government; namely, a mode rendered necessary by the
inability of moral virtue to govern the world; here too is the design and end
of government, viz. freedom and security. And however our eyes may be dazzled
with show, or our ears deceived by sound; however prejudice may warp our wills,
or interest darken our understanding, the simple voice of nature and of reason
will say, it is right.

   I draw my idea of the form of government
from a principle in nature, which no art can overturn, viz. that the more
simple any thing is, the less liable it is to be disordered, and the easier
repaired when disordered; and with this maxim in view, I offer a few remarks on
the so much boasted constitution of England. That it was noble for the dark and
slavish times in which it was erected is granted. When the world was over-run
with tyranny the least remove therefrom was a glorious rescue. But that it is
imperfect, subject to convulsions, and incapable of producing what it seems to
promise, is easily demonstrated.