道德情操论（英文全本）

在中国现代化的进程中，西方哲学社会科学始终是*重要的思想资源。然而，一个令人遗憾的事实是，自19 世纪末20 世纪初“西学东渐”起，国人对于西学的了解，基本上是凭借零星的翻译和介绍，认真地去读原著的人少之又少。这些中译本，囿于译者的眼光和水平，往往与原著出入颇大。因此，国人谈论西学的情景，很像是瞎子摸象，虽然各执一词，却皆不得要领。
当然，100年间，还是出现了一批学贯中西的学者，但其中肯花工夫于译业的太少。许多年积累下来，我们在这个领域拥有的优质中译本依然十分有限。而且，再好的译本，毕竟与原著隔了一层。倘若我们的学术界始终主要依靠中译本去了解和研究西学，我们的西学水平就永远不能摆脱可怜的境况。
好在现在有了改变这种境况的条件。在当今全球化时代，随着国门进一步开放，中外交流日渐增多，人们普遍重视英语学习，国人中尤其年轻人中具备阅读英文原著能力的人越来越多了。在这种形势下，本丛书应运而生。编辑者的计划是，选择西方哲学、人文学科、社会科学领域的*基本的英文经典原著，分批陆续出版，为有志者提供价廉的版本和阅读的便利。我赞赏这样的善举，并且相信，这也是为学术界做的一件益事。
周国平
2010 年2 月24 日
 

本书是亚当 斯密的伦理学著作，他一生中共修订过六次。斯密从人类的情感和同情心出发，讨论了善恶、美丑、正义、责任等一系列概念，进而揭示出人类社会赖以维系、和谐发展的秘密。
在本书中，斯密继承了以《沉思录》为代表的斯多葛学派的道德哲学思想，把“内心平静”而不是“物质享乐”看作人生幸福的重要标志，将人性中利他和利己这两种本性有机地结合在一起，为之后出版的《国富论》奠定了道德哲学的基础。《道德情操论》相比《国富论》给西方世界带来的影响更为深远，它对于促进人类福利这一更大的社会目的起到了更为基本的作用，是市场经济良性运行不可或缺的“圣经”，堪称西方世界的《论语》。

亚当 斯密（1723～1790）是经济学的主要创立者。1723年亚当斯密出生在苏格兰法夫郡（County Fife）的寇克卡迪（Kirkcaldy）。亚当 斯密的父亲也叫亚当 斯密，是律师、也是苏格兰的军法官和寇克卡迪的海关监督，在亚当斯密出生前几个月去世；母亲玛格丽特（Margaret）是法夫郡斯特拉森德利（Strathendry）大地主约翰 道格拉斯（John Douglas）的女儿，亚当斯密一生与母亲相依为命，终身未娶。这位英国苏格兰哲学家和经济学家，他所著的《国富论》成为了本试图阐述欧洲产业和商业发展历史的著作。这本书发展出了现代的经济学学科，也提供了现代自由贸易、资本主义和自由意志主义的理论基础。

1 Part I
1.1 Of the Sense of Propriety
1.1.1 Of Sympathy
1.1.2 Of the Pleasure of mutualSympathy
1.1.3 Of the Manner in which wejudge of the Propriety or Im-
propriety of the Affections ofother Men, by their concord
or dissonance with outown
1.1.4 The same Subjectcontinued
1.1.5 Of the amiable andrespectable Virtues
1.2 Of the Degrees of the different Passionswhich are consistent with Propriety
1.2.1 Of the Passions which taketheir origin from the Body
1.2.2 Of those Passions whichtake their origin from a partic-ular turn or habit of theImagination
1.2.3 Of the UnsocialPassions
1.2.4 Of the SocialPassions
1.2.5 Of the SelfishPassions
1.3 Of the Effects of Prosperity andAdversity upon the Judgment
of Mankind with regard to thePropriety of Action; and ‘why it
is more easy to obtain theirApprobation in the one state than
in the other
1.3.1 That though our sympathywith Sorrow is generally a
more lively sensation than oursympathy with Joy, it
commonly falls much more shortof the violence of what
is naturally felt by the personprincipally concerned
1.3.2 Of the origin of Ambition,and of the distinction of Ranks
1.3.3 Of the corruption of ourMoral Sentiments, which is oc-
casioned by this disposition toadmire the rich and the
great, and to despise orneglect persons of poor and mean
condition
2 Part II
2.1 Of the Sense of Merit and Demerit
2.1.1 That whatever appears tobe the proper object of grat-
itude, appears to deservereward; and that, in the same
manner, whatever appears to bethe proper object of resentment appears to deserve punishment
2.1.2 Of the proper Objects ofGratitude and Resentment
2.1.3 That where there is noapprobation of the conduct of the
person who confers the benefit,there is little sympathy,
with the gratitude of him whoreceives it; and that, on the
contrary, where there is nodisapprobation of the motives
of the person who does themischief, there is no sort of
sympathy with the resentment ofhim who suffers it
2.1.4 Recapitulation of theforegoing Chapters
2.1.5 The Analysis of the Senseof Merit and Demerit
2.2 Of Justice and Beneficence
2.2.1 Comparison of those twoVirtues
2.2.2. Of the sense of Justice, ofRemorse, and of the conscious-
ness of Merit
2.2.3 Of the utility of thisconstitution of Nature
2.3 Of the Influence of Fortune upon theSentiments of Mankind,
with regard to the Merit or Demerit ofActions
2.3.1 Of the Causes of thisInfluence of Fortune
2.3.2 Of the Extent of thisInfluence of Fortune
2.3.3 Of the final cause ofthis Irregularity of Sentiments
3 Part III
3.1 Of the Principle of Self-approbation and ofSelf-disapprobation
3.2 Of the love of Praise, and of that ofPraise-worthiness; and of the dread of Blame,
and of that of Blame-worthiness
3.3 Of the Influences and Authority of Conscience
3.4 Of the Nature of Self-deceit, and of the Origin andUse of general Rules
3.5 Of the Influence andAuthority of the general Rules of Morality,
and that they are justly regarded as theLaws of the Deity
3.6 In what cases the Sense ofDuty ought to be the sole Principle
of our Conduct; and in what cases it oughtto concur with other
Motives
4 Part IV
4.1 Of the Beauty which the Appearance ofUtility bestows upon
all the Productions of Art, and of theextensive Influence of this
Species of Beauty
4.2 Of the Beauty which the Appearance ofUtility bestows upon
the Characters and Actions of Men; and howfar the Perception
of this Beauty may be regarded as one ofthe original Principles
of Approbation
5 Part V
5.1 Of the Influence of Custom and Fashionupon our notions of
Beauty and Deformity
5.2 Of the Influence of Custom and Fashionupon Moral Sentiments
6 Part VI
6.1 Of the Character of the Individual, sofar as it affects his own
Happiness; or of Prudence
6.2 Of the Character of the Individual, sofar as it can affect the
Happiness of other People
6.2.1 Of the Order in whichIndividuals are recommended by
Nature to our care and attention
6.2.2 Of the Order in whichSocieties are by nature recommended to our Beneficence
6.2.3 Of UniversalBenevolence
6.3 Of Self-command
7 Part VII
7.1 Of the Questions which ought to beexamined in a Theory of
Moral Sentiments
7.2 Of the different Accounts which havebeen given of the Nature of Virtue
7.2.1 Of those Systems whichmake Virtue consist in Propriety
7.2.2 Of those Systems whichmake Virtue consist in Prudence
7.2.3 Of those Systems whichmake Virtue consist in Benevolence
7.2.4 Of LicentiousSystems
7.3 Of the Different Systems which have beenFormed Concerning
the Principle of Approbation
7.3.1 Of those Systems whichdeduce the Principle of Approbation from Self-love
7.3.2 Of those Systems whichmake Reason the Principle of Approbation
7.3.3 Of those Systems whichmake Sentiment the Principle of Approbation
7.4 Of the Manner in which different Authorshave treated of the
practical Rules of Morality